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Abstract In this article, we explore the ways in which partnerships with the state
within state-led developmental programs might effect the autonomy of civic organi-
zations (COs) and their readiness to enter in political action. To identify the
relationship between collaboration with the state and civic autonomy we draw on data
from a survey of 740 Hungarian regional civic associations. We did not find support for
the theses that mixing with the state might undermine the autonomy of COs and lead to
their political neutralization. Also, we did not find support for the hypotheses that
political action is solely about money or it is the property of non-autonomous NGOs.
We have identified several mechanisms that allow COs to combine participation in
partnership projects with maintained autonomy and political activism.
Re´sume´ Dans cet article nous explorons les fac¸ons dans lesquelles les partenariats
avec l’e´tat dans le cadre des programmes d’organisations civiques peuvent affecter
l’autonomie des organisations civique s (COs : Civic Organizations) et leur
empressement d’entrer dans l’action politique Pour identifier la relation entre la
collaboration de l’e´tat et de l’autonomie civique nous tirons les donne´es d’une
enqueˆte portant sur sept-cent quarante (740) associations civiques re´gionales hon-
groises. Nous n’avons pas constate´ de soutien pour celles-ci ; le me´lange en avec
l’e´tat pourrait saper l’autonomie des COs et mener a` leur neutralisation politique.
Aussi, nous n’avons pas trouve´ d’assistance pour les hypothe`ses stipulant que
l’action politique concerne uniquement l’octroi de finances ou est la proprie´te´ des
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MGOs d’actions autonomes. Nous avons identifie´ plusieurs me´canismes qui per-
mettent aux COs de combiner la participation dans des projets avec l’autonomie
maintenue et l’activisme politique.
Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit Partnerschaften mit dem
Staat innerhalb staatlich gefu¨hrter Entwicklungsprogramme die Autonomie bu¨rgerli-
cher Organisationen und ihre Bereitschaft zur aktiven Teilnahme am Politikgeschehen
beeinflussen ko¨nnen. Zur Verdeutlichung der Beziehung zwischen der Zusammenar-
beit mit dem Staat und der bu¨rgerlichen Autonomie beruft sich der Beitrag auf Daten
aus einer Befragung von 740 ungarischen regionalen Bu¨rgervereinigungen. Thesen,
die besagen, dass die Verbindung zum Staat die Autonomie bu¨rgerlicher Organisa-
tionen untergraben und zu ihrer politischen Neutralisierung fu¨hren ko¨nnte, konnten
nicht belegt werden. Des Weiteren wurden keine Beweise fu¨r die Hypothesen
gefunden, dass es bei einer aktiven politischen Teilnahme ausschließlich um Geld geht
oder diese nicht-autonomen nicht-staatlichen Organisationen vorbehalten bleibt.
Es ?tul?> wurden mehrere Mechanismen herausgestellt, die es Bu¨rgerorganisationen
erlauben, an Partnerschaftsprojekten teilzunehmen und gleichzeitig ihre Autnomie zu
wahren und eine aktive Teilnahme am Politikgeschehen fortzufu¨hren.
Resumen En este trabajo se analiza la influencia que las alianzas con el estado en
programas de desarrollo dirigidos por e´ste podrı´an tener en la autonomı´a de las
organizaciones cı´vicas y su disponibilidad a participar en medidas polı´ticas. Para
identificar la relacio´n entre la colaboracio´n con el estado y la autonomı´a cı´vica,
hemos utilizado los datos de un sondeo realizado a 740 asociaciones cı´vicas reg-
ionales hu´ngaras. En e´l, no hallamos ninguna conclusio´n que respaldara la tesis
segu´n la cual negociar con el estado podrı´a perjudicar la autonomı´a de las orga-
nizaciones cı´vicas y provocar su neutralizacio´n polı´tica. Tampoco encontramos
nada que respaldara las hipo´tesis de que el u´nico objeto de la accio´n polı´tica es
conseguir dinero o que es propiedad exclusiva de las ONG no auto´nomas. Tambie´n
hemos identificado varios mecanismos que permitirı´an a las organizaciones cı´vicas
participar en los proyectos de asociacio´n conservando su autonomı´a y haciendo al
mismo tiempo activismo polı´tico.
Keywords Civic organizations  Developmental partnerships  Partnership
projects  Civic autonomy  Civil society  Political action  Hungary
Research Questions
Over the last decade social and developmental partnerships increasingly involved
civic organizations. The emergence of these new localized developmental
partnership forms originates from a previous episode of institutional experimen-
tation.1 Faced with the failures of various market- and state-led developmental
1 For critical overview of the literature on developmental partnerships, see Howell and Pearce (2002) and
Kaldor et al. (2003).
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programs, national governments, international financial institutions, and multilateral
development agencies search for a third way, or a new way to organize development
(Evans 1997; Howell and Pearce 2002). With the goals of inducing economic
growth, furthering the development of market institutions, or increasing social and
economic cohesion, international developmental agencies have played a major role
in reviving the search for ways to capitalize on the collective problem-solving
capacities of combined local stakeholders (OECD 1995; UNDP 1993, 1995; World
Bank 1992, 1996). Such partnership projects, with state, business, and civic
participation became one of the most contested forms of institutional experimen-
tation. While some describe these institutional developments as democratic
innovation, others see them as new forms of depoliticization and domination.
Developmental partnerships that combine civic organizations with state and
market actors are viewed in two diametrically opposing ways in the literature. For
those who are supportive, the combination of civic organizations with diverse state
and non-state actors represents an innovative form of institutional experimentation.
In their view it allows diverse actors in local societies to combine and address
problems of market and state failure.2 These combinations represent an alternative
way of governing collective action among actors from diverse organizational fields
with a stake in local social and economic development. The inclusion of civic
organizations (COs) in such developmental programs and policy-making is seen
from this perspective as empowering, giving room for COs to represent interests,
considerations, and values that would otherwise be excluded. From this perspective
civic combination with state and market actors is seen as a mechanism that allows
for decentralized social experimentation and for accommodating a greater diversity
of social goals in developmental programs (Brown et al. 2001; Bruszt and Stark
2003; Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Sabel 1993, 1994, 1996; Stark et al.,
Unpublished manuscript, 2005).
Many others strongly reject these developmental combinations, arguing that they
are nothing but merely a cost-effective way of alleviating some of the social and
economic side effects of, variously, neoliberal policies, the downsizing of the
welfare state, or top–down developmental programs.3 The combination of COs with
diverse state and market actors at the domestic and supra-national levels turns them
into service organizations, ‘‘corporatizing’’ and depoliticizing them, leading to a
2 There are several roots of this approach. In economic sociology and the literature on forms of economic
governance, the works of Charles Sabel, Wolfgang Streeck, and Philippe C. Schmitter influenced most the
thinking about the role played by developmental associations or associative action (Sabel 1993, 1994,
1996; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). On linking local associative action and democratic experimentalism
in the framework of the concept of ‘‘directly deliberative polyarchy’’ see Sabel and Cohen (1997).
Another direction that influenced thinking on different developmental partnerships came from the
literature on the nonprofit sector linking associative action to the production of diverse types of public
goods (see the work of Powell and Clemens 1998). On deliberative association in post-socialist
transformation see Stark and Bruszt (1998).
3 For example, Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius in their introductory chapter to Global Civil Society 2003
subsume these combinations at the supra-national level under the rubric of new public management and
talk about the ‘‘basically neo-liberal role NGOs assume in public management manifestations.’’ (p. 9) See
also Chandhoke (2002), Kettle (2000), and Perrow (2001, 2002). For a more balanced critique of NGO
participation in partnerships see Howell and Pearce (2002).
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loss of autonomy. In this approach, partnerships with state and business are
contrasted with the civic associationism of a ‘‘strong and vibrant civil society,’’ and
with civic political activism, the ‘‘source of dissent, challenge and innovation, a
countervailing force to government and the corporate sector’’ (Kaldor et al. 2003,
pp. 1–17). If the political participation of COs in policy making is mentioned, it is
described as a means to ‘‘provide a semblance of democratic legitimacy’’ (Anderson
2000). Instead of empowerment, this area within the literature presents their
participation in partnerships with state and/or business as a mechanism of
disempowerment, and depoliticization.
Our task in this article is to study the relationship between closeness to the state
and civic autonomy. To do so, we have conducted a survey of 740 of the largest
civic associations in three Hungarian regions, allowing us (1) to document the
prevalence of their interactions with the state and other non-civic actors charting the
varieties these interactions take, and (2) to document the prevalence of various
developmental goals and diverse types of political action undertaken by these
organizations, and to register changes in their goals and political activities. Most
importantly, our data allow us (3) to analyze the relationship between these
processes as we investigate whether interactions with the state come at the expense
of the autonomy of civic organizations, their depoliticizing, or their giving up on
(some of) their goals. Are Hungarian civic associations losing their autonomy just at
the moment when they reach out to participate in collaborative developmental
projects? Or are there mechanisms at work that allow collaborative associations
with state and other actors outside the civic sector to co-exist with the maintenance
of civic autonomy?
These questions are especially important from the viewpoint of the evolution of
fledgling civil societies in the Central European new member countries of the
European Union. The introduction of new European developmental programs in
these countries led to a rapid increase in the numbers of diverse local and regional
developmental partnership projects. In Hungary, for example, more than 20,000
projects were submitted for consideration during the first year of the National
Development Plan, with around half involving civic organizations. In our survey of
the largest regional CO projects in Hungary we found that nearly two-third of CO
projects involved collaboration with actors from diverse organizational fields (state,
business, science, education, media, church, etc.). In more than half of the projects,
the partners of COs included at least one (local, regional, or national) state actor.4
Civic organizations in these countries are drawn into partnership projects within a
political framework that provides central state agencies with the right to define
developmental goals and ‘‘best practice’’ in achieving them (Bruszt 2002). Put
differently, the increasing inclusion of civic organizations in diverse partnership
projects in these countries goes hand in hand with attempts at (re)centralization and
the technocratic de-politicization of regional development. COs are invited
primarily to compete (‘‘tender’’) for the right to participate in the implementation
of the centrally defined developmental programs. They have only a weak formal
right to be consulted by planning authorities and must engage in political action if
4 Information based on interview in the Ministry of Economy and Trade (June 2005, Budapest).
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they wish to influence the formation of these developmental programs. But do they?
Or do these societies face a forced choice between civic autonomy and mixing with
the state?
We test several of these assumptions about the relationship between closeness to
the state and autonomy of the COs below. We proceed in three steps, starting with
the assumption that proximity to the state goes together with a loss of autonomy in
civil society. First we analyze how the presence of a state partner in CO projects or
ongoing activities affects changes in the number or mixture of goals, the loss of
certain goals, and changes in political activism. Here, our assumption was that, if
mixing with the state would result in a loss of civic autonomy, we would find a
narrower (less diverse) mix of goals, loss of a goal, and decreased political activism
by COs that enter into partnerships with the state. As we will see below, these
expectations have proven to be unsupported by the data. We do find COs that give
up on certain of their goals, and that leave political action, but we cannot explain
these changes by their closeness to the state. Rather, goal loss or political
deactivation goes hand in hand with a distancing from the state.
In the second step, we test three alternative explanations for the loss of CO
autonomy. None of these tests yields affirmative results. Collaborating with
business works similarly to partnership with the state: it seems to hurt neither civic
values nor goals. Nor do stopping collaboration with other civic organizations or
getting out of public attention by cutting collaborative ties to media organizations
account for loss in autonomy per se. It seems that civic control is maintained
through different channels, not primarily through direct partnering with other NGOs
or the media.
Here we are interested in the relationship between closeness to the state and the
autonomy of COs. We were unable to find a positive answer to the question about
the sources of declining CO autonomy. Given our measures for CO autonomy, we
could ‘‘only’’ establish that the idea of closeness to the state going together with
diminishing autonomy can be rejected. We find that a decline in the number and
diminishing mix of goals, and waning political activism go together with
distancing from the state. But do our indicators really measure autonomy? Is it
not for example possible that, just to the contrary, presence or increase in political
activism might indicate the loss or lack of autonomy? In the third step, we relax the
assumption that political activism—our most important indicator—stands for civic
autonomy, and instead test two hypotheses concerning political activism as sign for
lost or absent autonomy. One first reason for political engagement might be that
COs ‘‘go for the money:’’ thus, political activism could be predicted by prior
funding from the state. A second reason may be that it is not the autonomous COs
but rather the NGOs created by the (local) state which engage in political action.
Around one-third of regional NGOs in Hungary were created not by civic actors
but by the local state, and we might find that the state-created organizations are
primarily behind political activism. We test both of these hypotheses: if loss of
autonomy or the absence thereof has independent explanatory power in accounting
for political action, we cannot reject the assumption, held by representatives of
the pessimistic view, that closeness to the state and organizational autonomy are
negatively related.
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We have no reasons to assume that it is only the loss of autonomy or its absence
which can stand for political activism. In our model accounting for political
activism we controlled several alternative explanations for political activism
drawing freely on organizational theories and theories developed on the basis of the
study of the political organization of business interests. We found no support for
the thesis that political activity is solely about money, or that activism would be the
preserve of state-made NGOs. We identify several mechanisms that make COs
combine participation in partnership projects with autonomous political action.
Research Data
To identify the relationship between collaboration with the state and civic autonomy
we draw on data from a survey of Hungarian regional civic associations that we
conducted in 2003 in three ‘‘statistical regions.’’5 From among the seven ‘‘statistical
regions,’’ we choose the following three: Western Hungary, the most developed
region in Hungary that received the largest share of the foreign direct investment
from among different regions; the Northern Plain, the region most affected by the
social and economic dislocations of economic transformation in Hungary; and the
Southern Plain, a region representing roughly the Hungarian average, both in the
level of economic development and in the types of problems that it faces. Using the
database of the Hungarian Statistical Office (HSO) on NGOs in these three regions
we compiled a list that ranked nonprofit organizations by the size of their budgets.
We excluded organizations in the field of sports (e.g., soccer leagues) and leisure
time activities (e.g., stamp collectors) as well as foundations whose sole purpose is
to support a single organization (e.g., the fund-raising arm of a museum, hospital,
school, or church). From the remaining list, one-third of the organizations are
‘‘subsidiaries’’ of the local state: an NGO created by the local government. These
organizations were not excluded from the list; instead, their presence in the sample
allows us to compare the autonomy and political activity of COs and ‘‘subsidiary’’
NGOs. We employed students of the Institute of Social and European Studies
(ISES) at Daniel Berzsenyi College in Szombathely, which has a center of regional
studies with a strong track record in empirical research on regional development, to
administer our survey instrument of face-to-face interviews, typically with the
elected president or chief executive officer of the organization, or their deputies.
From an initial list of approximately 900 of the largest civic associations in these
three ‘‘regions’’ we were able to successfully contact 740 organizations distributed
roughly equally among the three ‘‘regions.’’
We took as a unit of our analysis the projects of these organizations. We asked
the representatives of these organizations to tell us how many projects they had
undertaken during the last two years. If they had more than three projects we asked
5 ‘‘Statistical regions’’ were created in Hungary during the process of preparation for the reception of EU
regional development funds. As the name suggests, these ‘‘regions’’ do not have autonomous political
representation.
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them to identify the three most important ones and then asked questions concerning
these projects. If they had three or less we asked questions concerning these
projects. If they had none, we asked questions about their ongoing activity.
We defined closeness to the state as active collaboration with at least one type of
state agency in developmental projects and/or in the ongoing activities of a CO. We
measure state proximity by the presence of a state partner in projects or ongoing
activity. Civil society autonomy, with reference to civic organizations was defined
as the power to make the rules that govern the internal affairs of the organization.
The most important of these internal affairs is setting the goals of the organization.
A CO is autonomous to the degree to which it can uphold its own values while
selectively taking into account the interests of others, making use of diverse external
opportunities. We measure civil society autonomy along the following dimensions:
change of goal mix (the number of goals), loss of a certain goal, and changes in
political activism.
We defined a project as ‘‘combinatory’’ if it had two or more different types of
goals and had two or more types of collaborative partners. For the identification of
goals pursued in the projects we have used a list of 22 developmental goals that we
took from the Regional Development Plans of these three regions.6 For each project
we asked whether the furthering of any of these goals was among the goals pursued
by the project. To identify the partners involved in these projects we used a list of 15
types of actors and for each project asked which had participated in the project.7
Political activism in general refers to intentional action to bring about social or
political change. Activism might be oriented towards diverse social constituencies
or towards various authorities, or might combine both. In the first case, COs might
try to create change by trying to alter the way people see specific issues, or to make
them act and thereby attain their active participation in collective action. In the
second case, we are concerned with action by COs to alter regulations, laws and/or
policies directly or indirectly at various levels of the state. Direct forms of political
action include attempts to alter regulations or laws at different levels of the state, or
lobbying for a policy goal. We define indirect forms of political action as attempts to
change balance of forces in the CO’s area of the activity.
For the first dimension of political activism, viz. that oriented towards diverse
social constituencies we asked questions about how often the organization tries to
change public opinion, to induce their active participation and/or to increase bottom
6 The list consisted of various social goals (improving health conditions, improving social conditions,
improving education, increasing employment, strengthening higher education) economic goals (further-
ing industrial development, furthering agricultural development, development of tourism, development of
firm creation, strengthening economic innovation, furthering capital influx in the region) environmental
goals (improving the quality of environment, optimal use of environmental resources, environmental
education) and general regional goals (improve transportation within the region, improve internal
cohesion in the region, improve external territorial relations of the region, further cross-territorial
communication, improving the administrative, political institutions of the region).
7 The list of actors used in the questionnaire: donors, central government, county government, local
government, Regional Development Council/Regional Development Agency, political party, other
domestic NGO, foreign NGO, international organization, church, media, a business organization,
scientific organization, and trade union.
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up initiatives in general. For political activism oriented towards authorities, we
asked how often the organization tries to put issues on the political agenda, to
change regulations at the level of national or local/regional government and/or alter
the balance of forces in its own area of activity (‘‘never,’’ ‘‘sometimes,’’ ‘‘often,’’
‘‘always’’). To identify project-related political activity we asked of each project
separately whether it included any of the following activities: organization of a
demonstration; petitioning; lobbying the parliament; lobbying the central govern-
ment; lobbying country and lobbying local government. We found a strong
correlation between activism oriented towards social constituencies and activism
oriented towards authorities: those engaged in one of these types of activism are
significantly more likely to engage in one of the activities that form part of the other
dimension. Because in this article we discuss the effects of closeness to the state we
focus on forms of political activism oriented towards the authorities.
As an alternative explanation for political activity we used embedding in local
society. We defined embedding as relationships of formal and informal account-
ability which tie a CO to diverse actors in local society. We speak of formal
accountability when a local CO has to report formally to various local social actors.
We speak of informal accountability when a local CO has to take into account the
interests of various local actors when making decisions. We have included
members, clients, other domestic NGOs, media and newspapers, trade unions, and
the general public amongst local social actors. Because of their increased local
activity in Hungary, we have also added foreign NGOs to this list. For each of these
types of actors, we asked how often the CO has to report to them and how often it
has to take their interests into account when making decisions (‘‘never,’’
‘‘sometimes,’’ ‘‘often,’’ or ‘‘always’’).
State Proximity and Autonomy
The assumption in the literature on civil society is that proximity to the state goes
together with a loss of autonomy in civil society. To evaluate this hypothesis we
need to operationalize two concepts: state proximity and civil society autonomy. We
measure state proximity by the presence of a state partner in CO projects or ongoing
activity. We measure civil society autonomy along the following dimensions:
change of goal mix (the number of types of goals, e.g., economic, social,
environmental), loss of a goal, and change in political activism. To address the
dynamics of civil society autonomy, we only use those COs that had at least one
project so that we can compare with ongoing activities, assuming that ongoing
activities precede that project. Since only about half of the organizations engaged in
projects, we work with between 347 and 383 cases, depending on missing responses
to the variable in focus.
After operationalizing state proximity and civil society autonomy, the next and
simplest step is to create a two-by-two table: proximity to the state or no proximity,
by autonomy or no autonomy (Table 1). (Logistic regressions then provide more
sophisticated versions of this simple table including controls.)
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State Proximity and Goals
In this first test we focus on the goals of the organization. Goals represent a
fundamental level of organizational autonomy. Resources, regulations, activism are
aspects that are influenced by many contingencies, scarcities, or limitations in
organizational capacities. Setting goals is somehow prior to these operational steps.
We argue that if we find that state proximity leads to the loss of goals, then we
capture a fundamental process of losing autonomy.
Table 1 shows that with this first approach we can reject the hypothesis that state
proximity goes together with a narrower definition of goals. Those NGOs that are
proximate to thestate aremore likely to have multiple goals (a more diversified goal mix).
Why go further? With this table we do not know if those NGOs that become
proximate to the state were different from the state-less NGOs in terms of their goals
before they became proximate to the state. There are several mechanisms that one
can cite, and which would predict that goal diversification can lead to state
proximity. For example: more diverse goals mean that there is a higher likelihood of
meeting more diverse partners, and so a higher likelihood of meeting state actors. It
may then be that this state partnership makes some of these diversified organizations
drop their goals.
This simple model leaves many questions open. The first and most important is:
does state proximity cause loss of autonomy, or does lack of autonomy cause state
proximity? Moreover, state proximity and lack of autonomy can arise at the same
moment, in the case of state created NGOs. This prompts a dynamic analysis:
beyond measuring state proximity we should measure tendencies in state proximity
(moving towards the state, or away from the state, or staying close, or staying
away). We also need to measure tendencies in autonomy in the same way. This
allows a temporal order to be established.
The basic table in this approach is a four-by-four table (Table 2). This table
provides further evidence to reject the hypothesis that state proximity leads to the
loss of civil society autonomy. According to the hypothesis, an NGO moving
towards the state (from having no state partner to having a state partner) should have
Table 1 State proximity and goal mix
Single goal Total
No Yes
State proximity No Count 76 84 160
Row % 47.5 52.5 100.0
Adj. Res. -2.5 2.5
Yes Count 114 73 187
Row % 61.0 39.0 100.0
Adj. Res. 2.5 -2.5
Total Count 190 157 347
Row % 54.8 45.2 100.0
v2 = 6.31, p = .012
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decreased goal diversity (the goal mix should become less mixed). This does not
happen. Moves in the direction of the state go hand-in-hand with a declining
probability of reduced goal diversity.
Another expectation is that those NGOs that stay away from the state should be
over-represented among those NGOs that maintain a diverse goal mix. This
hypothesis is also not supported: the no state–no state sequence is negatively
associated with maintaining a mixed goal portfolio (although the statistical
association is not significant: the adjusted standardized Pearson residual is -1.5).
The patterns of this table suggest that different processes are at work. Those
NGOs that are repeatedly proximate to the state (the state–state sequence) are the
most likely to maintain a mixed goal portfolio (with an adjusted standardized
residual of 2.6 this is a statistically significant association). Those NGOs that never
partner with the state (no state–no state sequence) are statistically more likely to
stay single-issue. Approaching the state (‘‘no state–state’’) is associated with a
growing (diversifying) mix of goals (adjusted residual of 1.9). While in the state
leaving group (‘‘state–no state’’) the most overrepresented category is a simplifying
goal mix. Changing state proximity is related to changing goal portfolio—but
completely in the opposite direction that we expected.
We also tested other aspects of autonomy. The first, still concerning goals, is
whether becoming connected to the state means that an NGO drops goals that it had
before. This measure is different from the previous measure: goal diversity is more
robust than any individual goals. An NGO can stay diversified in its goals yet loose
one or more goals that it had before. We now test this more stringent criterion of
losing autonomy (Table 3).
Table 2 State proximity dynamics and goal mix change
Goal-mix change Total
1 stays
single issue
2 more
mix
3 less
mix
4 stays
mixed
State proximity
dynamics
1 state-
[ state
Count 26 24 26 59 135
Row % 19.3 17.8 19.3 43.7 100.0
Adj. Res. -2.0 -.6 -.3 2.6
2 state-
[ no state
Count 12 14 16 19 61
Row % 19.7 23.0 26.2 31.1 100.0
Adj. Res. -1.1 .8 1.3 -.8
3 no state-
[ state
Count 16 15 5 16 52
Row % 30.8 28.8 9.6 30.8 100.0
Adj. Res. 1.0 1.9 -2.1 -.8
4 no state-
[ no state
Count 33 14 23 29 99
Row % 33.3 14.1 23.2 29.3 100.0
Adj. Res. 2.2 -1.5 .9 -1.5
Total Count 87 67 70 123 347
Row % 25.1 19.3 20.2 35.4 100.0
v2 = 19.09, p = .024
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Overall there is no significant relationship between state proximity dynamics and
losing goals. The direction of the-weak-statistical association is opposite to what we
expected. An NGO that become proximate to the state (‘‘no state–state’’) is slightly
less likely than average to lose a goal. In the whole sample 27.1% of organizations
lost a goal between their last two projects. Among those that become proximate to
the state only 21.2% lost a goal. Among NGOs with stable state proximity (‘‘state–
state’’) 24.4% lost a goal. NGOs that ceased to exhibit state proximity (‘‘state–no
state’’) were the most likely category to experience goal loss: exactly one-third,
33.3% of these NGOs lost a goal.
State Proximity and Political Activism
After analyzing goals, the next step is to understand actions. When discussing
autonomy, the most important kind of action is political activism, involving some
kind of contention. This is a critical capacity of civil society, and contention is seen
as involving the greatest risk when NGOs establish contacts with the state. Here
again we focus on dynamics, changes in state proximity, and changes in political
activism.
Table 4 presents the results about political activism and state proximity. Overall
the statistical association is not significant. If we focus on standardized adjusted
residuals, the highest deviation from expected frequencies is that those NGOs that
exit state proximity (‘‘state–no state’’) also become more passive (active–passive
sequence). This is contrary to the expectation that state proximity will decrease
activism. On the other hand, when an NGO becomes proximate to the state (‘‘no
Table 3 State proximity dynamics and goal loss
Lost a goal Total
No Yes
State proximity
dynamics
1 state- [ state Count 102 33 135
Row % 75.6 24.4 100.0
Adj. Res. .9 -.9
2 state- [ no state Count 44 17 61
Row % 72.1 27.9 100.0
Adj. Res. -.2 .2
3 no state- [ state Count 41 11 52
Row % 78.8 21.2 100.0
Adj. Res. 1.0 -1.0
4 no state- [ no state Count 66 33 99
Row % 66.7 33.3 100.0
Adj. Res. -1.7 1.7
Total Count 253 94 347
Row % 72.9 27.1 100.0
v2 = 3.38, p = .337
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state–state’’) then the sequence of political activation (‘‘passive–active’’) is over-
represented. Contact with the state goes together with increasing political activism.
We have also used logistic regression models to tests the above hypotheses
including controlling variables (results not shown here). They also failed to provide
support for the hypothesis about the negative relationship between state proximity
and autonomy. The models we used were not significant overall. In the model we
tested loss of goals as the dependent variable, the only significant coefficient we
found was that approximating the state makes it significantly less likely that an
organization will drop goals. In the model where political activism was the
dependent variable, we found that organizations that leave the state are more likely
to stop being politically active.
Loss of Autonomy: Alternative Explanations
We found that the dynamics of state proximity are not associated with changes in
political activism in the hypothesized way. We subjected this negative finding to
further scrutiny by assessing three alternative hypotheses. The lack of expected
statistical association between state proximity, goal loss, and political activism can
be attributed to competing forces that deactivate NGOs in the civic and political
fields.
One alternative expectation is that the commodification of civil society projects
leads to de-politicization. According to this expectation, as NGOs engage in
partnerships with business organizations, they adopt the market regime of worth,
Table 4 State proximity dynamics and political activism change
Political activism dynamics Total
1 active-
[ active
2 active-
[ passive
3 passive-
[ active
4 passive-
[ passive
State proximity
dynamics
1 state-
[ state
Count 10 10 15 106 141
Row % 7.1 7.1 10.6 75.2 100.0
Adj. Res. .9 -.4 .5 -.6
2 state-
[ no state
Count 3 10 3 49 65
Row % 4.6 15.4 4.6 75.4 100.0
Adj. Res. -.4 2.5 -1.5 -.3
3 no state-
[ state
Count 3 4 9 46 62
Row % 4.8 6.5 14.5 74.2 100.0
Adj. Res. -.3 -.4 1.4 -.5
4 no state-
[ no state
Count 6 6 10 93 115
Row % 5.2 5.2 8.7 80.9 100.0
Adj. Res. -.3 -1.2 -.4 1.2
Total Count 22 30 37 294 383
Row % 5.7 7.8 9.7 76.8 100.0
v2 = 10.57, p = .307
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and think about their activities as marketable services. This framing might be
incompatible with their previous goals, and especially political activism, so we
expect NGOs to lose their political activism as they start collaborating with business
organizations.
A second alternative expectation concerns the effects of losing civic control.
NGOs often collaborate with other NGOs in their projects. These collaborations can
be thought of as vehicles of collective monitoring, where it becomes possible to
sanction divergence from civic values. Once NGOs leave such collaborative
projects with other NGOs and engage in projects alone, they might loose civic
control, and hence might be more likely to abandon previous goals, and less likely
to engage in political activism.
A third alternative explanation for the loss of political activism concerns reduced
public attention—cutting collaborative ties to media organizations. Reputation is an
important currency in the NGO world. NGOs that collaborate with media
organizations are probably more careful not to abandon civic goals. We expect
that NGOs that move to projects without the participation of media organizations
after previous projects with media partnerships will be more likely to abandon their
original goals, and their political activism.
To test these alternative expectations we constructed contingency tables
following the same logic that we used in testing the hypothesis about the dynamics
of state proximity and change in political activism and the change in goals. Based on
the v2-tests and Pearson standardized residuals we can reject all three alternative
hypotheses.
As NGOs pick up project partnerships with businesses they become significantly
more likely to pick up new goals, and thus follow more diverse goals. This is
contrary to our expectations. NGOs do not drop their goals when they partner with
business, they do however lose goals when they exit such partnerships. Partnering
with business does not seem to hurt civic values and goals. We found no statistical
association between business partnership and political activism.
NGOs do not drop goals or become de-politicized when they leave projects with
other NGOs and engage in solo projects. It seems that civic control is maintained
through different channels, not primarily through co-organized projects.
The presence of media partners in NGO projects does not seem to be associated
with goal loss or political deactivation. Again, we need to rethink the nature of the
public in which civic projects are embedded. The absence of direct media attention
does not result in NGO opportunism.
Factors of Political Action
We found no support for hypotheses about autonomy loss connected to state
proximity. A declining number of goals, diminishing mix of goals, and waning
political activism go together with a distancing from the state. But do our indicators
really measure autonomy? Might it not, for example, be possible that, just to the
contrary, the presence of, or increase in political activism indicates a loss or lack of
autonomy?
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We stated that the most important kind of action in the context of autonomy is
political activism involving some kind of contention. This is a critical capacity of
civil society, and contention is seen at the highest risk when NGOs establish
contacts with the state. In previous analyses we assumed that political action is an
automatic sign of civic autonomy. Here we relax this assumption and consider
alternative explanations for political action. It might be that political activism is not
about autonomy but, just to the contrary, is a sign of the lost or nonexistent
autonomy of these organizations.
One possibility that we have considered was that political action was primarily
about money: political action might have not much to do with the desire to represent
local interests or increase room for decentralized experimentation. Instead, by
engaging in political action COs ‘‘go for money.’’ COs that have applied
successfully for central government or local government funds might have strong
incentives to try again, and are accordingly more likely to enter in political action—
e.g., into lobbying the (local, regional, or national) state to frame developmental
programs in the ‘‘right way.’’ To control for the effect of this factor, we used two
variables: whether the CO applied successfully for central government money
(‘‘Money from government’’) and whether the CO applied successfully for local
state money (‘‘Money from local government’’).
A second possibility that we have considered was that it is not the autonomous
COs that engage in political action but rather the NGOs created by the local state.
Such ‘‘subsidiary NGOs’’ might be the convenient lobbying arms of the local
governments giving a ‘‘civic’’ voice to local alliances trying to influence the central
state. To control for this effect we have used questions about the founders of the
NGOs and the membership of (local) state actors in the leading bodies of the NGOs.
If the (local) state was among the founders of the organizations and/or it was
represented on the leading body of the organization we counted the organization as
a ‘‘subsidiary NGO’’ (‘‘Founded by local government’’).
We have tested several alternative explanations for political activism drawing
freely on organizational theories and theories developed on the basis of the study of
the political organization of business.
One alternative might be that political activism is the effect of local
accountability relations: COs deeply embedded in the local society will not lose
their autonomy while combining with the state and are actually pushed into politics.
The extensive networks of accountability to local actors (members, clients, other
COs, the local public, etc.), whilst preventing regional COs from losing their
autonomy, also push them to pursue their goals both by participating in partnerships
and by politicizing the goals and values they represent. This hypothesis draws on
and extends the ‘‘logic of membership’’ argument of Schmitter and Streeck (1999):
organizational behavior is the function of local roots (characteristics of the
accountability to members).
Informal and formal accountability to local social actors means that COs have to
take into account the interests of diverse local actors when making decisions and/or
have to report to them. To assess the role of informal and formal accountability we
used the following variables in the equations below:
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1/ the CO has to take into account the interests of members, clients, other
domestic NGOs, foreign NGOs, the media/newspapers, the general public and the
trade unions
2/ the CO has to formally report to members, clients, other domestic NGOs,
foreign NGOs, the media/newspapers, the general public and the trade unions
We take our second alternative explanation from another co-authored paper of
Streeck and Schmitter: a specific pattern of state–NGO relationship pulls NGOs into
policy networks and makes them combine participation in collaborative projects
with political action (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). State actors, according to Streeck
and Schmitter, might have little incentive to work with non-autonomous COs;
rather, they might need contextualized information and guarantees for both
responsive policies and smooth implementation. Joint projects with COs are normal
political exchanges: state actors have strong incentives to find autonomous partners
and local COs need opportunities to pursue their goals. The stronger and more
encompassing the collaboration between state actors and COs, the higher the
likelihood that COs become part of policy networks. It is not closeness to the state
per se, but a specific pattern of interactions between the state and COs that accounts
for political activism. Or, put simply, political action by COs is the effect of deep
integration with the state. We test this hypothesis by using the results of a cluster
analysis of the different types of interactions between the central state and the local
COs (results not shown here). In the equations below we use the cluster of ‘‘‘Deep
integration’ with government.’’ This is a pattern of interaction with government that
combines direct participation of a state actor in the projects of the CO with formal
and informal accountability relationships and monetary contributions to the project.
A third explanation might be the size of the CO: larger, more resourceful COs,
and COs that are not dependent on a small number of sources for money might be
more able to afford to engage in political action. In the equations below we used the
logarithm of the size of the budget of the CO and the diversity of the sources of CO
revenue (types of monetary sources) to control for this effect.
A fourth explanation might be that goal combination might push COs into
political action: COs learn by combining. By pursuing more diverse goals they are
more likely to meet more diverse partners and are more likely to discover new
combinations of developmental goals and face the limitations in the way
developmental programs are framed by the state. This ‘‘learning through combin-
ing’’ might push COs to alter definitions of developmental goals and/or to frame
programs and policies in a more inclusive fashion. To test this hypothesis we have
used ‘‘goal mix,’’ standing for COs that combine all the three types of goals
(economic, social, and territorial–environmental) in their projects that we have used
in questionnaire. Finally, COs in one region might have different opportunities to
enter into political action than in others. We include variables for the Southern Plain
and Western Hungary, omitting the Northern Plain as the reference category.
Since political activism and partnerships happen at the level of projects and
ongoing activities, in this part of the analysis we use projects and activities as units
of analysis. The number of cases ranges between 1,243 and 1,279 in the three
models.
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Political Action: Attempt to Change Regulations
In the first equation below we used a logistic regression analysis with attempt to
change regulation at the level of central or local government as our dependent
variable (Table 5).
This model does not support the hypothesis that political activity is about
funding. The fact that a CO has applied successfully for central government money
or for local state money does not predict attempts to change regulations. We must
also reject the hypothesis that subsidiary NGOs are more likely to enter in political
action.
Table 5 Logistic regression, dependent variable: Attempt to change regulation at the level of central or
local government
B Exp(B) SE Wald Sig.
Goal mix .599** 1.820 .152 15.557 .000
Taking into account
Members .407* 1.502 .206 3.919 .048
Clients -.091 .913 .182 .251 .616
Domestic NGOs .161 1.175 .183 .773 .379
Foreign NGOs .453* 1.574 .205 4.872 .027
Media organizations .189 1.208 .183 1.068 .301
General public .350 1.419 .199 3.079 .079
Trade unions .383 1.467 .316 1.472 .225
Reporting to
Members .397* 1.488 .168 5.619 .018
Clients .232 1.261 .203 1.298 .254
Domestic NGOs .013 1.013 .191 .005 .946
Foreign NGOs .038 1.038 .267 .020 .888
Media organizations -.154 .858 .215 .509 .476
General public .267 1.306 .200 1.790 .181
Trade unions -.369 .691 .402 .845 .358
Logarithm of budget .590** 1.804 .102 33.125 .000
Types of monetary sources -.040 .961 .039 1.018 .313
Money from government .108 1.114 .157 .478 .489
Money from local government .056 1.058 .166 .114 .736
Founded by local government .175 1.191 .171 1.047 .306
Dependent on local government .043 1.044 .176 .059 .807
Deep integration with government .781** 2.184 .218 12.828 .000
Southern Plain -.167 .846 .163 1.047 .306
Western Hungary -.482** .618 .162 8.898 .003
Constant -3.006** .049 .466 41.638 .000
N = 1,243, Nagelkerke R2: .253
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01
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Goal combination has a significant effect on political action: highly combina-
tory COs are 1.8 times more likely to change central or local government
regulations. Accountability to local actors is another significant and independent
predictor of political action: COs that must take into account the interests of their
members are 1.5 times more likely to enter in this type of political action. The
effect of formal reporting requirements to members is similar. Whether or not
COs take into account the interests of foreign NGOs and of the general public has
the same effect.
The effect of the size of budget is also significant. COs with a budget one order of
magnitude greater (we used base-ten logarithm here) are 1.8 times more likely to
engage in this type of political action. COs that are deeply integrated in their
interactions with the central government are 2 times more likely to enter in political
action. Finally, COs in Western Hungary are significantly less likely to engage in
political action.
Political Action: Trying to Change the Balance of Forces
In the second equation below we used as our dependent variable whether or not COs
had attempted to change the balance of forces in the CO’s area of activity.
As in the equation above, local social relations of accountability matter
significantly. COs that have to take into account the interests of their members are
1.8 times more likely to alter the balance of forces. The effects of the need to take
into account the interests of general public, the interests of trade unions, and formal
reporting requirements to the general public are similar. Goal combination, on the
other hand, is not a predictor of this type of political action. COs which complain of
excessive dependency on local governments are 1.8 times more likely to enter into
this type of political action.
This model also fails to support the hypothesis that political action is about
money. The fact that a CO has applied successfully for central government money
or for local state money does not predict attempts to undertake this type of political
action. We must also reject the hypothesis that subsidiary NGOs are likely to enter
into this type of political action. Resources matter significantly: COs with larger
budget are 1.2 times more likely to try to alter the balance of forces. As above, COs
from Western Hungary are less likely to act (Table 6).
Political Action: Lobbying Central Government
Finally, in the third equation below we used lobbying central government as the
dependent variable (Table 7).
It is in this equation that we find an independent effect of receiving money from
central and local government. Both matter but in dramatically different ways.
Successful applications for central government money significantly increases,
successful application for local state money significantly decreases, the probability
of lobbying central government. This, however, is not the full picture. High goal
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combination doubles the probability of lobbying the government. Also, as in the
equations above, relations of local accountability are independent predictors of
political action: the need to take into account the interests of members, the need to
take into account the interests of trade unions and the requirement to report to other
domestic NGOs all significantly increase the probability of lobbying central
government.
Resources also matter: more resourceful COs, or COs that have more diverse
resource portfolios are somewhat more likely to lobby central government. Finally,
deep collaboration of COs with central government nearly doubles the probability of
this type of political action.
Table 6 Logistic regression, dependent variable: Attempts to alter the balance of forces
B Exp(B) SE Wald Sig.
Goal mix .216 1.242 .144 2.246 .134
Taking into account
Members .597** 1.817 .198 9.066 .003
Clients .025 1.025 .177 .020 .889
Domestic NGOs .203 1.225 .181 1.258 .262
Foreign NGOs .203 1.225 .199 1.044 .307
Media organizations -.328 .720 .181 3.294 .070
General public .539** 1.715 .195 7.626 .006
Trade unions .669* 1.952 .294 5.181 .023
Reporting to
Members .088 1.092 .162 .293 .588
Clients .093 1.098 .190 .241 .624
Domestic NGOs -.087 .917 .183 .226 .635
Foreign NGOs .179 1.196 .252 .504 .478
Media organizations -.099 .906 .207 .228 .633
General public .553** 1.739 .192 8.289 .004
Trade unions .548 1.730 .428 1.639 .200
Logarithm of budget .194* 1.214 .098 3.878 .049
Types of monetary sources -.009 .991 .038 .056 .812
Money from government .249 1.283 .155 2.578 .108
Money from local government .200 1.221 .161 1.544 .214
Founded by local government -.229 .796 .166 1.897 .168
Dependent on local government .632** 1.882 .179 12.536 .000
Deep integration with government .126 1.134 .198 .405 .525
Southern Plain .143 1.154 .159 .805 .369
Western Hungary -.327* .721 .155 4.430 .035
Constant -1.850** .157 .446 17.207 .000
N = 1,266, Nagelkerke R2: .212
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01
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Conclusions
In this article we have explored the ways in which partnerships with the state within
state-led developmental programs might effect the autonomy of civic organizations
and their readiness to enter in political action. We did not find support for the theses
that mixing with the state might undermine the autonomy of COs, and lead to their
political neutralization. Nor did we find support for the hypotheses that political
action is solely about money or it is the exclusive preserve of subsidiary NGOs. We
have identified several mechanisms that allow COs to combine participation in
partnership projects whilst maintaining political activism.
Based on the work of Schmitter and Streeck, we expected that the ‘‘logic of local
embedding’’ will be one of the factors of pushing COs towards political action. We
Table 7 Logistic regression, dependent variable: Lobbying central government
B Exp(B) SE Wald Sig.
Goal mix .718** 2.050 .143 25.274 .000
Taking into account
Members .451* 1.570 .231 3.829 .050
Clients -.211 .810 .200 1.107 .293
Domestic NGOs -.031 .970 .195 .025 .874
Foreign NGOs -.105 .900 .199 .281 .596
Media organizations -.174 .840 .186 .874 .350
General public .173 1.188 .213 .658 .417
Trade unions .592* 1.808 .260 5.205 .023
Reporting to
Members .063 1.065 .178 .125 .724
Clients -.012 .988 .196 .004 .953
Domestic NGOs .374* 1.453 .188 3.950 .047
Foreign NGOs .201 1.223 .234 .740 .390
Media organizations -.048 .953 .200 .059 .808
General public -.012 .988 .201 .004 .951
Trade unions .090 1.095 .341 .070 .791
Logarithm of budget .245* 1.277 .105 5.468 .019
Types of monetary sources .089 1.093 .040 4.974 .026
Money from government .574** 1.775 .170 11.457 .001
Money from local government -.530** .589 .174 9.311 .002
Founded by local government -.251 .778 .177 2.012 .156
Dependent on local government -.346 .708 .186 3.436 .064
Deep integration with government .679** 1.973 .185 13.528 .000
Southern plain -.098 .907 .162 .368 .544
Western Hungary -.468** .626 .167 7.869 .005
Constant -2.954** .052 .488 36.626 .000
N = 1,279, Nagelkerke R2: .164
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01
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found that participatory COs that are accountable to their members, and that are
integrated in local societies are significantly more likely to engage in political
action, either by trying to change regulations, by lobbying, or by trying to change
the balance of forces in their field of action. We also tested the ‘‘learning by
combining’’ hypothesis. We found that intense combinations with actors from other
organizational fields, including the state, far from reducing political activism, is
instead an independent factor in explaining civic political activity. Finally, we tested
the ‘‘political exchange’’ hypothesis and found that deeper forms of collaboration
with the state significantly increase the likelihood of civic political action. Using the
language of the social movement studies, we can say that the changed opportunity
structure (the growing possibility of combining with the state in developmental
projects) alters CO’s action repertoire but does not transform activist organizations
into mere service organizations.8 The growth in collaborative developmental
projects does not endanger the autonomy of integrated civil societies.
Based on our findings we can also say that it is misleading to underestimate the
transformative potential of associative civic action involving collaboration with
actors from other organizational fields.9 In forging various developmental associ-
ations, civic organizations that work together with actors from other organizational
domains (business, national and local government, education, church, etc.) can
contribute to the coming about of local and regional publics, thereby allowing the
formulation and implementation of more inclusive policies and programs. While
making alliances across groupings and integrating what had formerly been
disjointed, civic organizations’ projects draw connections between interests that
perhaps had not been seen as compatible. They are therefore producing new frames
in which dissimilar notions of the public good can be redefined and associated. In
that sense, the combination of associating diversity in ever-changing developmental
projects with political action might lead to the occurrence of what Fraser called
‘‘strong publics:’’ arenas for assembling diverse ideas, metrics of valuation, and
interests for joint policy formulation, not just implementation (Fraser 1994).
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